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The impact of announcements of large-scale purchases of government bonds on real GDP
and the CPI in the United Kingdom and the United States is explored with a Bayesian VAR,
estimated on monthly data from 2009M3 to 2014M5. Four different identiﬁcation
schemes are used, all leaving the reactions of GDP and CPI unrestricted, and the trans-
mission channels of the policy are examined. An asset purchase announcement of 1% of
GDP leads to a statistically signiﬁcant rise of 0.58% (0.25%) and 0.62% (0.32%) rise in real
GDP and CPI for the US (UK). The transmission channels differ in the two countries.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In response to the 2008–9 ﬁnancial crisis, both the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve undertook large-scale asset pur-
chases (LSAP), buying government debt as a means of providing monetary stimulus once interest rates were reduced as far as
deemed possible. A number of academic studies have examined the effects of this unconventional policy. For example Chung et al.
(2012) used the Federal Reserve Board’s macroeconomic model to show that real GDP and inﬂation were respectively 3% and 1%
higher as a result of US LSAPs. Kapetanios et al. (2012) used a range of BVAR methods to explore the effects of the Bank of England’s
purchases, ﬁnding that GDP and CPI were raised by 2.5% and 1.5% as a result of the ﬁrst round of asset purchases in the UK.
This paper takes previous work on asset purchases in four new directions. First, in contrast to most existing studies, three
mechanisms are explored through which asset purchases may inﬂuence output and prices. Secondly, the passage of time, together
with use of monthly data, allows us to estimate our model using only data since March 2009 when the policy was ﬁrst introduced.
This makes our results less susceptible to bias from the introduction of the new policy regime, and hence the Lucas Critique and
structural breaks, than any other empirical study of this issue. We also explore whether our results are materially affected if the
acute phase of the crisis, in 2009, is omitted from our data. Thirdly, effects found in VAR-based studies (e.g. Kapetanios et al., 2012)
were identiﬁed on the assumption that asset purchases led to a rise in real GDP and CPI only through their impact on the long-
term interest rate. Here, instead, four different identiﬁcation schemes are used to identify asset purchase shocks. All of these leave
both the transmission mechanism and the responses of real GDP and CPI unrestricted. The possibility implied by Eggertson and
Woodford (2003) that, except as a result of signaling the future path of short-term rates, asset purchases have no impact on GDPer B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
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parameter priors. Our analysis is carried out using a non-informative normal inverse-Wishart prior, avoiding possible bias from
priors that are set too tightly to let the data speak.
Theoretically, asset purchases might affect demand through three different mechanisms. The ﬁrst is the so-called portfolio
balance channel (Vayanos and Vila, 2009). This relies on the presence of investors with a preferred habitat for a given maturity in
the government bond market. If this is the case, purchases of long-term government debt have the effect of reducing yields on
debt of the maturities purchased, through their impact on term premia. An alternative mechanism is the signaling channel—the
idea that purchases signal that the policy interest rate will remain at its effective lower bound for longer. This was originally
suggested by Eggertson and Woodford (2003) and Bernanke et al. (2004). Gagnon et al. (2011) found little evidence to support it
but Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) suggested that rather stronger signaling effects were present. A third possible mechanism is
that asset purchases help to manage expectations about future economic outcomes and hence reduce economic uncertainty.2 All
of these channels might lead to wealth effects from higher asset prices and raise consumption and investment.
Our modeling framework allows us to explore which mechanisms may play a role by including relevant variables in the VAR
one-by-one. If the portfolio balance (signaling) mechanism is behind the reduction in government bond yields, one should observe
a relatively greater reaction of government debt yields (interest rate futures) at longer (shorter) maturities. Inclusion of yields at
both maturities makes it possible to establish whether either mechanism is relevant. Further, inclusion of the VIX and a weighted
average of implied interest rate futures’ volatilities (MOVE) make it possible to examine the impact on uncertainty and risk-taking.
We ﬁnd that an asset purchase anouncement shock worth 1% of nominal GDP, leads to a peak impact of about 0.62%
(0.25%) of real GDP and 0.58% (0.32%) in CPI in the US (UK). Conditional forecast exercises, the method of choice for cal-
culating the total impact of QE1 in Baumeister and Benati (2013) and Kapetanios et al. (2012), suggest a total GDP and CPI
impact broadly similar to that found by scaling up the peak impacts derived from the impulse response analysis. The overall
real GDP and CPI impact of QE1 obtained with our approach is generally only slightly higher than Baumeister and Benati
(2013) and Kapetanios et al (2012) for their US and UK real GDP and CPI responses to spread shocks, despite allowing for
more transmission channels. But there is one notable exception: for the UK, our results suggest that the impact on the CPI is
almost three times as large as the effect reported in these studies. The implied UK inﬂation-output trade-off is larger than in
the US, meaning that the same change in GDP would have a greater impact on UK inﬂation. These estimates are, never-
theless, in line with studies of conventional monetary policy for the UK and the US.
In terms of the transmission mechanism, our study suggests that US asset purchases inﬂuence yields on medium and long-
term government debt, but not interest rate futures, which implies a role for the portfolio rebalancing, rather than the signaling,
channel. In contrast, UK purchases do not have clear impacts on either interest rate futures or long rates. In both countries there
is evidence that announcements have the effect of reducing measures of ﬁnancial market and household uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains our model and discusses the details of our identi-
ﬁcation schemes. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.2. Methodology and data
We use the following VAR model estimated on monthly data:
Yt ¼ αcþ
XL
k ¼ 1
AkYtkþet ; et N 0;Σð Þ ð1Þ
where Yt is a vector of the following endogenous variables: the announcement of asset purchases divided by nominal GDP;
the log of CPI; the log of real GDP; the yield on the 10-year government bond and the log of real equity prices at time t. Ak is
the array of coefﬁcients associated with the corresponding lagged vector of variables for lag k. et is a vector of residuals at
time t. This is assumed to be normally distributed with variance–covariance matrix Σ. When the time-series dimension is
small, estimates of Ak are likely to be imprecise. Previous work has addressed this problem by relying on Bayesian methods
of inference and imposing a Litterman (1986), or time-varying parameter, prior. But there is always the risk that tight priors
dominate information from the data. Our approach avoids this problem. The model is estimated with a non-informative
normal inverse-Wishart prior, as3 in Uhlig (2005) and a lag length, L, of two throughout.42 This is in line with Woodford (2003), who argues that the main transmission mechanism of modern monetary policy is through management of
expectations about inﬂations and real GDP growth.
3 Jarocinski and Marcet (2013) propose imposing priors on the growth rates of variables, as opposed to priors on parameters, as the least controversial
way to impose priors in small sample VARs. But it is unclear how to choose suitable priors for variables in our VAR such as real GDP, CPI or asset purchase
announcements during this turbulent period of time. That is why it seemed better to use the normal inverse-Wishart prior, with hyperparameters set to
small values to ensure that the prior is non-informative (Uhlig, 2005). See Appendix D of his paper for more information.
4 Ex ante lag length tests such as the Hannan–Quinn or BIC criterion suggest a lag length of 2. When our model was estimated with six lags, it was, as a
result of the short time-series, necessary to use a Litterman (1986) prior, with the hyper-parameters estimated from the data following the approach in
Giannone et al. (2015). This suggests that a 1% US (UK) asset purchase announcement leads to a peak impact of .53 (.23) and .61(.37) on real GDP and CPI,
respectively. These values are almost identical to those found with two lags and described in Section 3.1.
Table 1
Identiﬁcation schemes.
This table shows the restrictions imposed by each of the four identiﬁcation schemes. Gray shading indicates that the response of the variable (in the
column) to the shock (in the row) is unrestricted, þ indicates that it is restricted to be non-negative, 1 to be 1, 0 to be zero and – to be non-positive.
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The challenge for structural VAR models is to disentangle orthogonal, structural economic shocks, εc;t , from the corre-
lated reduced form shocks ec;t . This is typically done using a matrix C0, such that C0ec;t ¼ εc;t . We use four ways of inferring
C0, zero restrictions, sign restrictions, a combination of zero and sign restrictions, and ﬁnally sign variance decomposition
restrictions. All of these identiﬁcation schemes are described in Table 1.
Identiﬁcation scheme I uses a lower-triangular scheme, with asset purchases ordered after real GDP and prices, but
before all of the other variables. The identifying assumptions are therefore that output and prices react with a lag and that
aside from responding to these two, asset purchases do not react to any other variable upon impact.
VAR identiﬁcation schemes that employ timing exclusion restrictions have been criticized in recent years, on the grounds
that such restrictions do not naturally emerge from DSGE models. Canova and de Nicoló (2002), Faust and Rogers (2003) and
Uhlig (2005) have therefore proposed identifying shocks by means of the implied signs of the impulse responses that they
produce. Clearly, for identiﬁcation restrictions of this type to be valid, they need to be strongly supported by economic
theory. In the presence of ﬁnancial frictions, such as imperfect substitutability between long and short bonds (Harrison,
2012) or preferred habitat investors (Vayanos and Vila, 2009), economic theory does suggest that a rise in asset purchases
will lead to a fall in the interest rate on long-term bonds, by reducing term premia. But even in the absence of frictions,
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and Woodford, 2003), depressing the long rate. Secondly, lower yields on longer maturity bonds are likely to lead to some
reallocation towards other assets, such as equities, generating a rise in real equity prices. Thus our deﬁnition of an asset
purchase shock is that it leads to lower long-term rates and higher equity prices.
We also identify aggregate demand and supply shocks. A demand shock would typically lead to a rise in prices and output.
The rise in prices, together with the fact that ﬁrms may require greater ﬁnance for production, is likely to lead to a non-negative
response of the long interest rate. The rise in demand would also lead in expected proﬁts and thus to a rise in real equity prices.
The sign restrictions used to identify an aggregate supply shock are identical, other than assuming that prices fall rather than rise.
This identiﬁcation scheme, referred to as scheme II throughout the paper, is summarized in Table 1 and implemented with the
QR approach presented in Rubio–Ramírez et al. (2010). Unless otherwise noted, all sign restrictions are imposed upon impact and
one month thereafter with the exception of asset purchase announcements, where the sign restriction is imposed upon impact
and for 5 months thereafter here and also in identiﬁcation schemes III and IV.
In identiﬁcation scheme II, the assumption is that asset purchases affect the real economy via portfolio rebalancing from
long-term government bonds into equities, to distinguish them from aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks. But a
priori it is not clear to what extent the mechanisms that are required for asset purchases to affect the yield on long-term
government debt operate in reality. More importantly, to distinguish asset purchase from aggregate supply shocks, it is
necessary to assume that long-term interest rates rise in response to an aggregate supply shock. Theoretically, a positive
aggregate supply shock may lead to a rise in investment, competition for funds and higher bond yields, but also a decline in
bond yields as a result of the monetary policy reaction to lower consumer prices. Empirically, Dedola and Neri (2007) and
Peersman and Straub (2009) examine the reaction of the short-term interest rate in response to technology shocks in SVARs
for the US and Euro Area, respectively. Peersman and Straub (2009) show a positive medium-term reaction of the short rate
to technology shocks, while Dedola and Neri (2007) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect. While the long rate restrictions are thus
consistent with their results, we nevertheless drop them in identiﬁcation scheme III below.
This is possible, as long as one is willing to make the assumption that asset purchases do not react contemporaneously to
aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. In that case, the restriction on real equity prices is sufﬁcient to distinguish
these shocks from asset purchases. Given that monetary policy makers do not observe aggregate demand or supply shocks
within a month, the assumption of a zero contemporaneous reaction of asset purchases to aggregate demand and supply
shocks is realistic. An additional advantage is that this allows us to identify a fourth shock, namely a rise in uncertainty/risk
premia. This shock is identiﬁed as a decline in real equity prices, to which the monetary policy authority reacts with a rise in
asset purchases, perhaps as a result of a coincident ﬁnancial crisis. Unlike demand and supply, these types of shocks can be
observed in real time. This identiﬁcation scheme is referred to as identiﬁcation scheme III throughout. It is implemented
using the procedure in Arias et al. (2014), who generalize the standard QR restrictions algorithm to include zero restrictions
as well. Ours is, of course, not the only paper to use a combination of zero and sign restrictions to identify unconventional
monetary policy shocks. Gambarcorta et al. (2014) adopt a similar approach.
Identiﬁcation schemes I–III rely on the idea that shocks can be distinguished based on restrictions on impulse responses.
But it is also possible to use variance decomposition restrictions to separate different economic shocks (Faust and Rogers,
2003; Uhlig, 2005). The idea here is that a shock that is variable-speciﬁc shocks should explain the largest fraction of the
variance in that variable.5 In identiﬁcation scheme IV, asset purchase announcement shocks are assumed to explain the
largest fraction of variation in asset purchases upon impact and with a three period delay. This makes it possible to drop the
zero restrictions and also the sign restrictions on real equity prices. This scheme is implemented in a fashion similar to
identiﬁcation scheme II, with the QR approach by Rubio–Ramírez et al. (2010), but rather than keeping impulse responses
which are consistent with a particular sign, only those consistent with the variance decomposition restrictions in Table 1 are
retained.
At present the theory underlying asset purchases is not sufﬁciently well understood to devise an identiﬁcation scheme
which would allow us to identify asset purchase announcement shocks perfectly. It is for this reason that we sequentially
relax the strongest identiﬁcation restrictions from the ﬁrst scheme to the last one. Despite this pecking order, it is never-
theless not possible to claim that one scheme is necessarily better identiﬁed or preferable to another. As a result we study
the effects of asset purchases in all four cases paying particular attention to results which are signiﬁcant with at least three
of the four schemes adopted in this paper.
2.2. Data
All of the VAR models in this paper are estimated on monthly data for the period when asset purchases were an active
policy tool in both the UK and the US, from 2009m3 to 2014m5. Monthly real GDP data for the UK are provided by the
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (Mitchell et al., 2005), while monthly real GDP data for the US are taken
from Macroeconomic Advisers.
The monthly indices of consumer prices are the ofﬁcial measures. UK Value Added Tax, an important ﬁscal contributor to CPI
movements, was reduced from 17.5 per cent to 15 per cent in January 2009, raised to 17.5 per cent in January 2010 and raised5 Our approach is similar in spirit, but not technique, to the penalty function approach ﬁrst proposed in Uhlig (2005).
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Fig. 1. Asset purchase announcements in the US and the UK. This ﬁgure shows total asset purchase announcements in the US and the UK over time,
collected from public Federal Reserve and Bank of England statements. The US data do not include announcements about open-ended purchases. These are
discussed in Section 3.4.
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introduces. CPIYexcludes the immediate effects of changes to indirect taxes. For the United States the variable used is the consumer
price index published by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. Real equity prices are calculated by obtaining monthly averages of daily
data for the FTSE100 and S&P500 obtained from Thomson DataStream and deﬂating by CPIY and CPI, respectively.
The asset purchase announcement series are constructed in the following manner: For the UK, asset purchase
announcements are simply cumulated over time. For the US, we treat asset purchases associated with the maturity
extension program (Operation Twist) as additional asset purchases, attaching the same weight to them as asset purchase
announcements of government bonds ﬁnanced with the issue of central bank reserves. The effect of giving them a smaller
weight is explored in Section 3.4. The asset purchase series are shown in Fig. 1. Unlike the UK, the US also announced open-
ended asset purchases. The effects of these are also explored further in Section 3.4. The series for the UK asset purchase
announcements are computed from the published Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee. For the US, these data are
taken from Federal Reserve Board announcements.6
In order to explore the three possible transmission mechanisms it is necessary to study the impact, if any, of asset purchases
on other variables. If the portfolio balance channel is the main transmission channel, one would expect a relatively large impact
on the yields of 20 and 30-year government bonds. The signaling mechanism, on the other hand, implies a relatively stronger
reaction of the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) futures of the 3-month interest rate, 6 months, 1 year and 2 years ahead. We also
examine the impact of our identiﬁed asset purchase shocks on two ﬁnancial market indicators of uncertainty: the VIX (implied
stock market volatility) and the MOVE (weighted average of implied interest rate volatilities at different horizons). To tease out
whether movements in these variables reﬂect economic uncertainty or investors’ risk appetite, we also look at a survey measure
of household uncertainty and the BBB-AAA corporate bond spread. Details of the data are provided in online Appendix E.3. Results
This section describes our main results. It compares them with earlier work which has studied asset purchases through
the impact on the yield curve. The transmission mechanism and the robustness of our ﬁndings are also explored.
3.1. Main results
Fig. 2A and B show the results for both countries for each of our four identiﬁcation schemes, with the row labels
indicating the scheme in question.
An inspection of Fig. 2A and B clearly suggests that regardless of identiﬁcation scheme, real GDP and the CPI always rise
in response to an asset purchase shock. This effect is statistically signiﬁcant throughout, except for identiﬁcation scheme I
for CPI in the UK. Table A1 in online Appendix A shows the maximum impacts of the median and indicates their signiﬁcance.6 The series are used as percentages of annualised 2009Q1 nominal GDP in order to avoid the endogeneity issues which might arise from scaling by
current nominal GDP.
Fig. 2. (A) Results for the standard speciﬁcation – United States. This ﬁgure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in
response to an unexpected 1% asset purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all
four identiﬁcation schemes for the US. 10,500 simulations, with the ﬁrst 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. The units of the vertical
axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the announcement. (B) Results for the
standard speciﬁcation – United Kingdom. This ﬁgure shows, for each of the variables in our model, the median impulse responses in response to an
unexpected 1% asset purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four iden-
tiﬁcation schemes for the UK. 10,500 simulations, with the ﬁrst 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. The units of the vertical axes are
shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the anouncement.
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IV than they are with scheme I. This probably reﬂects the role that economic theory plays in identifying the effects with
these schemes. Averaging across all four schemes, the maximum impact on GDP is 0.58 in the United States and 0.25 in the
United Kingdom (Table A1, online Appendix A). The ﬁgures for the CPI are 0.62 and 0.32, respectively.
Baumeister and Benati (2013) and Kapetanios et al. (2012) use a conditional forecasting approach to quantify the impact
of QE on real GDP and CPI in the US and the UK respectively. Online Appendix B contains the results of a similar exercise
(Waggoner and Zha, 1999) which suggest that QE1 raised GDP in the US (UK) by about 2 (4) percentage points at its peak
impact; QE2 (QE2/3) added about 6 (4) percentage points. The CPI in the US was increased by an amount similar to the
increase in GDP in each case while in the UK both QE1 and QE2/3 raised the CPI by just under 6 percentage points. As
discussed in detail below, scaling up the peak impacts derived from the impulse response analysis yields broadly similar
numbers.
To relate our multipliers to those presented in previous work, we compare the effects of the US and the UK QE1 implied
by the impulse responses in those studies, to the peak impact implied by the impulse responses in this paper. Baumeister
and Benati (2013) for the US and Kapetanios et al. (2012) for the UK argue that the ﬁrst round of asset purchases in the US
and the UK led to fall of about 100 basis points in the spread between the long-term and short-term interest rate. It is then
easy to see that the estimates in those papers imply a rise of 1.08 (2.5)% and 0.9 (1.5)% in GDP and CPI in the US (UK),
respectively. During QE1, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England engaged in government bond purchases worth 2%
and 14% of annualized 2009Q1 GDP, respectively. Based on the estimates in this paper, this would lead to a rise of 1.12
(3.08)% and 1.2 (4.2)% in US (UK) real GDP and CPI, respectively. When the effect of MBS purchases is included, the estimates
for US real GDP and CPI become 1.4 and 1.5. For the UK, the impact on real GDP is slightly higher than previous work, but the
Fig. 3. (A) Results for a shock to the long rate – United States. This ﬁgure shows, for each of the variables list above, the median impulse responses in
response to a 1% decline in the long rate, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show results for all four identiﬁcation schemes for the US. 10,500
simulations, with the ﬁrst 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. (B) Results for a shock to the long rate – United Kingdom. This ﬁgure
shows, for each of the variables list above, the median impulse responses in response to a 1% decline in the long rate, together with 68% Bayesian credible
sets. We show results for all four identiﬁcation schemes for the UK. 10,500 simulations, with the ﬁrst 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the
responses. The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the
anouncement.
M. Weale, T. Wieladek / Journal of Monetary Economics 79 (2016) 81–93 87CPI response is almost three times as large. This difference is not statistically signiﬁcant but produces estimates for the
inﬂation-output trade-off which are more in line with previous studies of conventional monetary policy in VARs for the UK.7
3.2. Comparison with the term spread shock approach
These quantitative differences may arise as a result of the identiﬁcation scheme or the data on which the model was
estimated. Both can be explored. First, our model structure can be modiﬁed to explore the role of shocks to the long rate.
Since policy rates were constant in both countries, we simply apply the same identiﬁcation scheme, but with the long rate
substituted for asset purchases.8 This allows us to explore the role of long rates as a possible transmission route of asset
purchases. Fig. 3A and B show the impulse responses from this exercise and Table A2 of online Appendix A their maximum
impact. An unexpected shock leading to a 100 basis points decline in the long rate has the effect of raising both GDP and CPI
by about 1.06% only in the United States.
These results, and quantitative estimates of QE1 obtained with our approach, which are very similar to previous ﬁndings,
are consistent with the idea that the US asset purchase announcements affect real activity through their impact on long-
term government bond yields. In other words, the spread identiﬁcation scheme used by previous work might be correct for7 A comparison to previous work can be found in online Appendix D.
8 For identiﬁcation scheme I, we order the long rate after output and prices, but before real equity prices. For identiﬁcation scheme II, it is assumed that
the long rate falls and real equity prices rise in response to unconventional monetary policy. For the identiﬁcation scheme III, it is assumed that aggregate
supply and demand shocks cannot affect the long rate contemporaneously. The risk/uncertainty shock is then identiﬁed as a shock that leads to a decline in
real equity prices and the long rate, while the unconventional monetary policy shock is identiﬁed as a shock that leads to a decline in the long rate and rise
in real equity prices. Finally, in identiﬁcation scheme IV, it is assumed that a long rate shock should explain the greatest fraction in the long rate forecast
error variance decomposition. All other restrictions remain the same.
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channels other than the long rate.
In online Appendix C we show that our results do not depend on the inclusion of the ﬁrst round of asset purchases in the
data set. Fig. C1 shows results estimated over the period 2010m3–2014m5. This omits the period when the ﬁnancial crisis
was at its most extreme. Our results are not greatly affected, suggesting that the impact of the second and third rounds of
purchases in the UK and the US was not very different from the impact of the ﬁrst round. This suggests that asset purchases
did not become less effective over time. Fig. C2 looks at results estimated from 2007m1–2014m5. We now ﬁnd that the
effects on GDP are larger than in Fig. 2A and B. There is no signiﬁcant effect on CPI in the UK with any of the identiﬁcation
schemes although the median impulse remains positive in all four cases. The inclusion of the UK data before asset purchases
were introduced might therefore explain why previous work found a smaller effect on CPI inﬂation; indeed our estimates
(Table C2) for this period imply an inﬂation/output trade-off of 0.37 rather than the value of 1.3 implied by our main results.
This conﬁrms our view that analysis over this extended period may be subject to the Lucas critique: in this case it seems to
bias the UK inﬂation response to unconventional monetary policy to be substantially lower than we ﬁnd it to be. For the US,
Tables C1 and C2 show that the quantitative magnitudes are larger, but the relative impact on output and inﬂation remains
the same as in the base line case.
In summary, this suggests that the observed differences from previous work arise from both the inclusion of pre-asset
purchase data and the difference in identiﬁcation schemes in the latter. The resulting biases are substantially larger for the
UK than the US.Fig. 4. (A) Results for Portfolio Balance & Signaling Channels – United States. This ﬁgure shows, for each of the variables list above, the median impulse
responses in response to an unexpected 1% asset purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets. We show
results for all four identiﬁcation schemes for the US. 10,500 simulations, with the ﬁrst 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. OIS 6M, OIS
12M and OIS 24M are the 3-month rate, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months ahead. 20Y and 30Y GB YIELD are the yields on 20 and 30 year government
debt. The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the
anouncement. (B) Results for Portfolio Balance & Signaling Channels – United Kingdom. This ﬁgure shows, for each of the variables list above, the median
impulse responses in response to an unexpected 1% asset purchase announcement as a fraction of 2009Q1 GDP, together with 68% Bayesian credible sets.
We show results for all four identiﬁcation schemes for the US. 10,500 simulations, with the ﬁrst 10,000 as burn-in, were used to generate the responses. OIS
6M, OIS 12M and OIS 24M are the 3-month rate, 6 months, 12 months and 24 months ahead. 20Y and 30Y GB YIELD are the yields on 20- and 30-year
government debt. The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since
the anouncement.
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Economic theory suggests three different ways in which asset purchases can affect demand. First there is portfolio
rebalancing. If investors have preferred habitats, then asset purchases will either affect yields with the highest interest rate
risk or yields at the maturity purchased through the impact on duration and scarcity, respectively. This should be reﬂected in
a reduction of the term premium rather than a reduction in expected future spot rates. An alternative friction which leads to
similar effects comes from the presence of transaction costs leading to imperfect substitutability in the government bond
market (Harrison, 2012). These changes, together with associated spillovers into equity and private debt markets, are likely
to lead to increases in both consumption and investment.
Secondly, as Bauer and Rudebusch (2014) argue, any announcement of unconventional policy may mean that interest
rates will be kept at the zero lower bound for longer. In other words, the expected average short-term interest rate will
decline as a result of the announcement. A reduction in either component, the term premium (portfolio rebalancing) or the
average expected short-term interest rate (signaling) will lead to a decline in the long-term interest rate with subsequent
impacts on demand. But portfolio rebalancing, through the impact on term premia, is likely to have a relatively larger impact
on 20 and 30-year maturity government bond yields, while the signaling channel should be reﬂected in movements of
short-term interest rate futures. We include all of these variables into our model to asses which effect is stronger.
Thirdly, asset purchase announcements can help the central bank to manage households' and ﬁrms' real GDP growth and
inﬂation expectations. If asset purchases make people more conﬁdent that the monetary authorities have a means of
supporting the economy despite the fact that short-term interest rates are at the zero lower bound, then the perceived
variance of future output and inﬂation will decline. This is likely to result in a decline in measures of ﬁnancial market
uncertainty. This can reﬂect either a reduction in household uncertainty about durable consumption or greater risk-taking
by investors, as they search for yield. Both of these channels can support demand by raising consumption and reducing
premia (spreads) on risky lending.
The reduced-form nature of structural VARs does not allow us to decompose the estimated impacts into contributions
from these different transmission channels directly. We can, however, identify variables which we would expect to be
affected by asset purchases if each of these mechanisms plays a role in the transmission of this policy.
The extent to which each transmission mechanism should operate in each country clearly depends on the presence of
ﬁnancial frictions in the government bond market. The average maturity of government bonds was 4.2 and 14 years in the
US and the UK government bond markets at the end of 2007, which implies greater liquidity premia (transaction costs) in
the US government bond market. Similarly, Asian central banks are natural preferred habitat investors in the US government
bond market (Turner, 2011). This descriptive evidence would suggest a greater ex ante role for the portfolio balance channel
in the US, rather than the UK. To examine if this is the case, we include the yields on government bonds of 20 and 30 years
maturity, as well as the 3-month rate, 6, 12 and 24 months ahead, as the sixth variable in the VAR. The results are shown in
Fig. 4A and B and the maximum impacts in Table A3 of online Appendix A.
Table A3 demonstrates that, for the US, two sets of results show signiﬁcant effects with at least three of the identiﬁcation
schemes. Twenty-year bond rates are affected by asset purchase shocks in all four schemes, while 30-year bond yields are
signiﬁcant in three out of four schemes. While negative effects are also found more generally, they are not signiﬁcant. Table A3
also illustrates the problems associated with relying on only one identiﬁcation scheme. In particular, identiﬁcation scheme two
suggests that most of the included variables are signiﬁcant, particularly for the UK.
Looking ﬁrst at the US, Fig. 4A shows that the impact on 20-year debt yields is similar to that found with long (10-year)
bond yields shown in Fig. 2A, although of course for scheme II that was an identifying assumption. Interest rate futures tend
to move in the right direction, but are not statistically signiﬁcant. A reasonable conclusion is that these results provide
evidence for the portfolio balance channel operating in the US, or that asset purchases affected yields on long-term debt.
In the UK there is greater sensitivity of the results to the identiﬁcation scheme. Both the long-term government bond
yield and interest rate futures react in a statistically signiﬁcant manner only with scheme II. Thus the responses of OIS and
long-term rates do not, overall, provide good evidence that either portfolio balance or signaling play signiﬁcant roles in
the UK.
Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) use several dynamic term structure models to decompose the movements in long
rates which they associate with asset purchases. They ﬁnd that in the US the movements were largely the result of expected
future short rates (signaling) while in the UK falls in term premia dominated (portfolio balance channel). There are several
reasons why our results may differ from those of Christensen and Rudebusch (2012). First of all, they estimate their models
using daily data stretching from the late 1980s until the end of 2010, since a long sample is needed to mitigate biases in the
estimation of their model. As a result they need to make the assumption that asset purchase announcements are just normal
shocks to the Treasury bond market. However, if this assumption is violated, their results may be susceptible to the Lucas
Critique. Secondly, they look at the immediate impacts of announcements of asset purchases at daily frequency, while we
are interested in movements at lower frequencies. Thirdly, their model assumes that the path of interest rates can be
represented by a Brownian motion. This assumption may be invalid for the shorter end of the yield curve whose path might
be explicitly constrained by the zero lower bound.
Asset purchases can, of course, also have a direct impact on the real economy by reducing uncertainty and managing
expectations about future economic outcomes. Deaton (1992) shows how uncertainty depresses the current level of con-
sumption and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) how it reduces investment. Woodford (2003) argues that the one of the most
Fig. 5. (A) Results for the uncertainty channel – United States. This ﬁgure shows the response functions of the VIX, the MOVE, a measure of household
uncertainty (HHUNC) and the spread between BBB and AAA corporate bonds to an asset purchase shock. Results are shown for the US for each of our four
identiﬁcation schemes. Five hundred simulations were used to generate the responses. The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the
horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the anouncement. (B) Results for the uncertainty channel – United Kingdom. This ﬁgure
shows the response functions of the VIX, the MOVE, a measure of household uncertainty (HHUNC) and the spread between BBB and AAA corporate bonds to an
asset purchase shock. Results are shown for the UK for each of our four identiﬁcation schemes. Five hundred simulations were used to generate the responses.
The units of the vertical axes are shown for each column, while the horizontal axis indicates the number of monthly time periods since the anouncement.
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while Boivin et al. (2012) argue that there is empirical support for this view. Expectations management is likely to reduce
uncertainty, having effects on demand which do not need to be transmitted through ﬁnancial markets, although it may
reduce market risk premia.
We explore the impact on two measures of ﬁnancial market uncertainty for that purpose: the implied volatility of the share
price index (VIX) and interest rate futures (swaptions) in each country (MOVE). Two of the interpretations taken by previous work
are that these measures reﬂect real economic uncertainty (Bloom, 2009) or investors’ risk appetite (Bruno and Shin, forthcoming).
To disentangle these two different interpretations, household survey measures of uncertainty and the BBB–AAA corporate bond
spread into are included as a sixth variable in our VARmodel to establish whether there is a signiﬁcant response to asset purchase
shocks. The results are shown in Fig. 5A and B and the peak impacts are found in Table A4 of online Appendix A.
Fig. 5A and B and Table A4 demonstrate that both the VIX and MOVE show signiﬁcant movements in the UK, while only
MOVE does so in the US. Bloom (2009) argues that the VIX is a reﬂection of uncertainty. On the other hand, Adrian and Shin
(2010), Bruno and Shin (forthcoming) and Miranda-Aggripino and Rey (2013) argue that the VIX is a reﬂection of investor’s
risk appetite. Interestingly, the reaction of household uncertainty over durable purchases suggests that the ﬁrst inter-
pretation is relevant for both countries. Similarly, the fact that corporate bond spreads react signiﬁcantly in three of the four
identiﬁcation schemes for the UK only is stronger evidence that the risk-taking channel plays a role in the UK.
3.4. Robustness
We examine the robustness of our results from two perspectives. First, we investigate whether they may be subject to
omitted variable bias and then explore whether they are materially affected by the way in which the announcements of
asset purchases are deﬁned.
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Due to the short sample size, our baseline model consists of ﬁve variables. But it is well known that small VARs may
suffer from omitted variable bias. The asset purchase shock may reﬂect the reaction of the monetary authority to coincident
developments, such as domestic ﬁscal policy, the Euro Area crisis, real oil prices and monetary expansion by the European
Central Bank. This can be explored by including the domestic government budget balance to GDP ratio, the public debt to
GDP ratio, the spread between Italian and German 10-year government bond yields, the natural logarithm of real oil price in
the US dollars/UK sterling, the ratio of the ECB’s total assets on its balance sheet to Euro Area GDP, the trade balance to GDP
ratio and the real exchange rate one by one in our VAR. The impulse response charts are shown in online Appendix C,
Figs. C3–C9 while Tables C3–C9 make clear the maximum effects and statistical signiﬁcance.
A comparison of the base results for the mean maximum effects in Table A1 with those in Tables C3–C9 shows that these
results are robust to the inclusion of additional variables. For the United States all four identiﬁcation schemes continue to
show a signiﬁcant impact on CPI; for the United Kingdom scheme I does not show a signiﬁcant effect, just as it did not in our
basic model. However, in the majority of cases our main effects of interest are statistically different from zero and they are
quantitatively very similar to the estimated effects from the model presented in Fig. 2A and B.
3.4.2. Deﬁnition of the announcement series
Our model assumes that macroeconomic variables tend to respond to announcements, rather than actual asset pur-
chases. But it is worth verifying whether our results are robust to using the actual amount of assets purchased instead.
Similarly, in contrast to the UK, the nature of asset purchases in the US has changed over time, with the Federal Reserve
engaging in Operation Twist and open-ended purchases, as well as purchases of mortgage-backed securities. This means
that a number of assumptions were needed to create the asset purchase announcement series for the US and it is
demonstrated that our results are robust to all of them in this section.
There were six possible alternatives for the United States; only the ﬁrst of these is also relevant to the United Kingdom.
Looking at the amount of assets purchased rather than the announcements, the impulse response effects (Fig. C10) remained
signiﬁcantly above zero in all four cases.
In our asset purchase announcement series, announcements associated with the Federal Reserve’s maturity extension
program (also known as Operation Twist) receive the same weight as asset purchases of government bonds that were
ﬁnanced through the issue of central bank reserves. While it is clearly difﬁcult to pinpoint the right weight for Operation
Twist announcements, we also explore results with a weight of one half, probably a reasonable lower bound, in Fig. C9.
These results are similar to our baseline results, but not signiﬁcant for identiﬁcation scheme IV for the real GDP response. If
the portfolio channel is an important part of the transmission mechanism in the United States, as the earlier results suggest,
then perhaps it is not surprising that signiﬁcance is reduced when Operation Twist is down-rated.
The Federal Reserve Board also announced open-ended purchases of government bonds at a rate of $US 45 billion per month
in 2012. It is unclear how to translate the magnitude of this announcement to one that is comparable to other US asset purchase
announcements. At the time of the announcement, guidance was also provided that the federal funds rate would stay low until
unemployment had reached the 6.5% threshold. FOMC minutes that accompanied the announcement suggested that this would
be met in 2015, implying that purchases would continue for at least 3 years. One way of calculating the economic impact of the
open-ended asset purchase announcement is therefore to calculate the present value9 of an asset that pays $US 45 billion each
month, for 36 months. This suggests that the economic impact of the open-ended asset purchase announcement was about $US
1217 billion. Financial markets may of course take a different view and an examination of OIS rate futures data suggest that they
expected a rise in the 3-month OIS rate 24, but not 12 months ahead. Assuming that open-ended QE will expire after 18 months
yields an economic impact of $US 702 billion, which is similar to the impact of the second asset purchase announcement ($US
600 billion). In December 2013, the FOMC announced that the rate at which assets were purchased would slow. This
announcement is treated as an unwinding of the open-ended purchases, meaning that $US 1217 billion and $US 702 billion are
subtracted from the total asset purchase announcement series for the 18 and 36 months cases, respectively. This is shown in
Figs. C12 and C13. The GDP response is signiﬁcant with all four schemes while the CPI response is signiﬁcant with the ﬁrst three
with all our different assumptions about how long open-ended purchases last.
In addition to government bonds, the Federal Reserve also purchased large quantities of mortgage-backed securities. Most of
these purchases were made before March 2009, when government bond purchases began, and from September 2012, when
open-ended purchases of mortgage backed securities at a rate of US$ 40 billion USD per month were announced. Following the
same approach as for government bonds the present discounted value of mortgage-backed securities for 18 and 36 months
respectively is added and then subtracted. We also add the MBS purchases before 2009m3 to our series. The impact of asset
purchases (Figs. C14 and C15) on GDP is still statistically signiﬁcant in at least three out of four identiﬁcation schemes. While the
evidence for CPI is weaker, the major part of the 68% Bayesian credible sets is above zero.
A comparison of Figs. C12–C15 with Fig. 2A and Tables C12–C15 with Table A1 suggests that the peak responses in these
four variants are generally lower. This is to be expected since the total sum of purchases is larger, and we should not look for
robustness in terms of the coefﬁcients. Our ﬁndings about statistical signiﬁcance are, however, robust to the deﬁnition of
asset purchases used.9 The yield on the 10-year government bond in the month prior to the announcement was the discount rate used for our calculation.
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In response to the ‘Great Recession’, central banks deployed a range of novel monetary policy tools, but their impact on
the economy is still not well understood. In this paper we study purchases of government bonds by the Bank of England and
the Federal Reserve. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of asset purchases on GDP and CPI without making the identifying
assumption that this is positive and with models estimated only on the period in which asset purchases were carried out;
models estimated over a longer period may be more susceptible to the Lucas critique. The analysis also makes more use of
non-informative priors than does any other paper in this literature.
Our results suggest that an asset purchase shock that results in the central bank purchasing government bonds worth 1%
of nominal GDP, leads a rise of about 0.62% (0.25%) of real GDP and 0.58% (0.32%) in CPI in the US (UK). These results are
robust to including a number of different additional variables in the VAR. Similarly, using the actual amount of assets
purchased as the main variable of interest and, for the US, various perturbations to the deﬁnition of asset purchases makes
little difference to our ﬁndings. Our estimates10 of the impact of asset purchases on real GDP and CPI are similar to studies
that identify unconventional monetary policy as a compression in the spread between the long and the short rate (Bau-
meister and Benati, 2013; Kapetanios et al, 2012), with one notable exception: for the UK, the CPI response is almost three
times larger than documented by previous work; the implied inﬂation-output trade-off is, however, consistent with studies
of the conventional monetary policy transmission mechanism and may help explain why the UK inﬂation was higher than
expected after asset purchases began.
For the United States long-term bond yields respond to asset purchases while short-term swap rates do not. This sug-
gests that the portfolio balance may play a role while it is unlikely that signaling is important. Asset purchases reduce
measures of ﬁnancial market and household uncertainty in both countries. In addition, in the UK there is a rise in the
appetite for risk. This suggests that managing expectations through reducing uncertainty (Bloom, 2009) may be relevant for
both countries, and the risk-taking channel (Bruno and Shin, 2015) for the transmission mechanism in the UK.
Our results have important implications for policy. In both the UK and the US asset purchases were an effective means of
supporting GDP in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis, and they retained their effectiveness beyond the acute phase of the
crisis. This should provide considerable reassurance for those who are concerned that, with interest rates still at or close to
their lower bound, monetary authorities will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to respond to renewed global demand weakness.Acknowledgments
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